"Objetividad científica” y sesgos en la toma de decisiones jurídicas: los casos de genética forense y de algoritmos
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La “objetividad” y “neutralidad” de la ciencia pueden conducir a la discriminación y a la violación de derechos fundamentales de las personas. Para evitarlo, es necesario respetar algunos principios en el uso de la ciencia como base de decisiones de relevancia jurídica, como emerge en el caso de la genética forense y de la inteligencia artificial.
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