Remedial Design under scarcity: Judicial Regulatory reasonableness as a Second-Order Standard
Main Article Content
Abstract
This article proposes a second-order legal standard for evaluating judicial remedies under scarcity. It starts from a tension: when courts protect social rights through orders that require public expenditure, administrative coordination, or institutional reconfiguration, the decision does not merely interpret rights; it operates as a regulatory-like intervention with fiscal, distributive, and institutional effects that are not always made explicit. The article argues that the debate should not be confined to the legitimacy of judicial review but must incorporate criteria for comparatively justifying the remedial architecture chosen among legally admissible alternatives, since principles such as progressive realization, non-retrogression, or the “maximum available resources” standard rarely provide operational guidance for that choice. Drawing on economic analysis of law, constitutional theory, and institutionalism, it develops judicial regulatory reasonableness under scarcity as a standard aimed at making remedial design auditable. The proposal integrates three interdependent dimensions: the right’s enforceable threshold and equity in access, so that litigation does not operate as a de facto distributive criterion; the fiscal and distributive governability of induced expenditure; and the institutional–epistemic feasibility of the order under imperfect information and limited capacity. It distinguishes predominantly individualized remedies from remedies with systemic components and argues that recurrent noncompliance increases the burden of justifying case-by-case responses. The standard is organized into a transferable matrix, illustrated through Decision T-760/2008 and contrasted with Brown v. Plata. Its contribution is an analytical tool that renders contestable and reviewable what often remains rhetorical in remedial justification.
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